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SCHOLARLY BOOKS:
WHAT, TO WHOM AND WHY
James . White*
A consideration of the role that the books reviewed in this edition will
play in the future of American legal thought has led me to speculate about
the transmission of ideas into acts and about the role of books in that transmission. In certain arenas, tracing an idea from its origins to its ultimate
application is straightforward. For example, the evolution of Germany's
Schlieffen plan for invading France can be traced with little difficulty from
the circumstances responsible for its birth, through years of refinement, to
its eventual application in World War .1 The development and acceptance
of a medical innovation such as a new drug or type of treatment provides
another useful illustration. One can easily reach back to an innovation's
origins in basic scientific research and development and trace its progress
through applied
research, clinical investigation and gradual acceptance by
2
practitioners.
In contrast, the progress from idea to act in the law is obscure and difficult to trace.3 It is often impossible even to reach agreement whether a
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1956, Amherst College;
J.D. 1962, University of Michigan. - Ed.
1. See generally M. KITCHEN, A MILITARY HISTORY OF GERMANY 171-75, 192-95 (1975)
(explaining the instigative circumstances, development, nature and results of the Schlieffen

plan).
2. For instance, a potential innovation in the treatment of gallstones had its beginning in
research concerning the dissolution of grease soap. This basic research was first applied to the
general study of the detergent effects of human bile. Subsequent clinical investigation has
confirmed that individuals afflicted with the most common sort of gallstones have bile with less
than normal detergent properties. The result of this work is possible treatment for some gallstones by feeding patients bile salts to dissolve the stones. The treatment's safety and efficacy
must be further documented, but if the outcome is satisfactory, practitioners will have a choice
of treating patients with gallstones medically rather than surgically. See Ingelfinger, Spreading
the Medical Word, in THE HORIZONS OF HEALTH 380 (H. Wechsler, J. Gurin & G. Cahill, Jr.
eds. 1977).
When such choices are presented to practitioners, the acceptance of a medical innovation is
far from random. A mid-sixties case study of four midwestern cities revealed a definite pattern
in the medical community's acceptance of a new drug as measured by prescription of the drug
in appropriate circumstances. While several channels of influence preceded a physician's
adoption of a new drug, social intermediaries such as a pharmaceutical company representative or colleague had far greater influence than impersonal media such as medical journals.
The drug was first cautiously adopted by "innovator" doctors who had either read about the
drug in medical journals or heard about it from the pharmaceutical company's detail man.
Doctors acquainted personally, and especially professionally, with the "innovator" doctor soon
followed in using the drug in their practices. Over time, the drug became an important part of
every doctor's prescription repertoire. See J. COLEMAN, E. KATZ & H. MENZEL, MEDICAL
INNOVATION (1966). See also Dannatt, Primarysources ofinformation, in UsE OF MEDICAL
LITERATURE 15 (2d ed. L. Morton 1977).
3. One rare exception is Justice Roger Traynor's extensive incorporation of Dean William
Prosser's ideas throughout his opinions and particularly in the application of strict liability for
defective products, attributable to the close personal relationship between Prosser and Traynor. See G. WHTrrE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 179 (1980). The most notable instance of Tray-
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given act by the legislature or the courts is stimulated by or is a manifestation of any particular idea. Our court's "reasons" as often obfuscate the
origin of an idea as illuminate it. In part our difficulty is undoubtedly the
result of the law's suppression of change. In contrast to medicine and many
other endeavors, the law neither welcomes nor graciously accepts change.
Rather, in the interest of preserving certainty in the regulation of men's
affairs, the law resists all appearance of change. Thus courts often disguise
their modifications ofjudicial doctrines and sometimes even go so far as to
deny that any change has occurred.
Despite this difficulty in tracing the course of idea to act, one must concede that the principal purpose of any legal writing is to influence behavior,
ultimately to change the behavior of lawyers, judges or the population at
large. There are many lesser goals, such as enriching the author in money
or status, but it is my hypothesis that all serious legal writing aims to change
behavior. If one accepts that hypothesis, he confronts a challenge upon
examining the sort of books reviewed in this volume. They are not books
that will alter the drafting of a contract or a prospectus. They are not even
books that will change the behavior of a lawyer at trial or in negotiation. In
the several pages that follow I wish to examine the hypothesis and raise
some questions about how the ideas expressed in these books might influence behavior. I will also compare books in general as an instrument for
that purpose with some other modem devices.
nor's application of Prosser's theory of strict liability for defective products is his concurrence
in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring). In Escola, a waitress was injured when a soda bottle exploded in her hand while
she was carrying it. Despite the fact that the defendant showed it made regular inspections of
the bottling process, the California Supreme Court held for the plaintiff; Traynor concurred
separately. In his concurrence Traynor argued that liability should be placed wherever it
would most effectively reduce hazards to life and health from defective products reaching the
market. Traynor concluded that the manufacturer should be held liable because it could distribute the risk of injury among the public as a cost of doing business. Prosser had stated in his
1941 treatise that morally and practically the producer should be held liable because he was
best able to distribute the risk to the general public through prices and insurance. W. PposSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 689 (lst ed. 1941). In addition, Traynor, like Prosser,
was sensitive to the difficulties faced by a consumer in proving negligence existed, even with
the aid of res ipsa loquitur. Compare 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441, with W. PROSSER,
supra. Other parallels can be found in Traynor's rejection of an extended warranty theory as a
basis for holding manufacturers liable to consumers, 24 Cal. 2d at 465-67, 150 P.2d at 442-43,
and in his limiting of strict liability to injuries from "normal and proper use," 24 Cal. 2d at
468, 150 P.2d at 444; Prosser had defined the scope of strict liability in precisely the same
manner. W. PROSSER, supra, at 689-92. Finally, Traynor borrowed heavily from Prosser in
citation of authority. See G. WHiTE, supra, at 197-200 (1980).
Another related example might be the conversion of other justices on the California
Supreme Court to Traynor's strict liability approach following emphasis by Prosser and other
scholars of a supposed trend in the courts toward extending imposition of strict liability to
manufacturers of defective products. See G. WHITE, supra, at 202.
In commenting upon the significance of Traynor's use of Prosser's idea, G. Edward White
has written:
It was one thing for Prosser to collect authorities, marshall reasons, and argue for strict
liability in the abstract; another for Traynor to show, through an impressive synthesis of
case law and academic writing, the apparently obvious advantages of strict liability treatment for defective products. Traynor's Escola opinion came at a time when strict liability
theory was in an embryonic state; he gave it a model for practical application.
G. WHITE, supra, at 200 (1980).
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At the outset one must ask, who reads these books? If they are never

read, they can have no influence (except, of course, on the author). If they
are read only by a small and uninfluential audience, they will have a correspondingly small and uninfluential impact. Surely the books reviewed here
will have quite different audiences. A few will sink without a trace like
rocks cast in a pond, never to be read or to be rejected by the few who read

them. Others will float briefly like the leaves of a tree, to be considered by a
small audience before they too sink from sight. A few will be like messages
put in a bottle, to float for years in obscurity until they are discovered by an
audience of significant size and power.
Limited generalizations are possible concerning the audience for these
books. The first is that few of them will ever be read by lawyers in their

professional roles. Perhaps the law was once a learned profession; it will
have difficulty laying claim to that title now. It is hard to visualize the trial
lawyer home from a long day of depositions or court appearances sitting
down to read Alan Watson's book, The Making of the Civil Law. It is

laughable to conceive of Paul Newman (in The Verdict) or Jerome Carlin's
Lawyers On Their Own curling up with a copy of Posner or Dworkin. That

is not to say that no lawyer will ever read any of the books here reviewed,
only that lawyers are not the audience for which these books are intended.

These are not books peddled by the West salesmen; they are not books that
offer any immediate reward in money or success; they are not books that
will be read by lawyers.
It is hardly more likely legislators or judges will read them. Legislators,
particularly at the state level but also at the federal level, are notorious for

their lack of interest in the long term or in deeper matters. 4 Even the bright

and able ones, such as the late Hubert Humphrey, are noted for learning
4. In recent years being a state legislator has changed from an avocation to a vocation.
Ironically, the professionalization of state legislatures may even have exacerbated the problem
by increasing the importance of reelection. Where once the defeated amateur could easily
return to his private occupation, doing better financially than before his legislative stint, today's professional state legislator has severed or neglected such ties. Frequently the state legislator views his office as merely a stepping stone to a higher position. Even if he has more
"static" ambitions, the state legislator is too beholden to potentially fickle constituents to be
interested in the long-term consequences of his activities. Finally, even "amateur" legislators
find they lack the time and resources to achieve altruistic objectives of making "good public
policy." See generally H. INGRAM, N. LANEY & J. MCCAIN, A POLICY APPROACH TO POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 44-49 (1980); W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS 9, 17-18, 26-33, 155-56 (5th ed. 1981); A. ROSENTHAL, LEGISLATIVE LIFE: PEOPLE,
PROCESSES AND PERFORMANCE IN THE STATES 38-61, 280, 340-45 (1981); Lockard, The State
Legislator, in STATE LEGISLATURES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 98 (A. Heard ed. 1966).
Over the past decade or so, it has also become clear that a predominant goal of any Senator
or Congressman is reelection and the concomitant enhancement of power and status within
Congress. To ensure reelection, an overwhelming amount of time must be spent servicing
specific constituent requests and guarding district interests. Even if a Senator or Congressman
occasionally finds time to pursue broader policy aims, he remains conscious that his activities
must be readily explainable to the electorate. While recent findings hint at a possible increase
in voluntary retirement from Congress, at present it is not possible to discern the magnitude or
ramifications of such an increase. See generally R. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS INTHEIR DISTRICTS 137-57 (1978); R. JONES & P. WOLL, THE PRIVATE WORLD OF CONGRESS 7-14 (1979); W. KEEFE & M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 26-31, 10910 (5th ed. 1981); D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974); Cooper &
West, Voluntary Retirement, Incumbency and the Modern House, 96 POL. Sci. Q. 279 (1981).
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things by listening, not by reading. So surely legislators are not an audience
for these books.
Will judges, persons more judicious and reflective than the typical lawyer, read these books? That too seems unlikely. While our judges enjoy
respect and status not accorded other members of the bar, there is no reason
to believe they are brighter or necessarily more reflective than the average
lawyer. At the upper reaches where one might expect to find the most able
of our judges, we hear that they are swamped with work; they are in exactly
the same position as the lawyer who has little time for reflection simply
because he has a series of pressing deadlines. At the trial level one suspects
that the judges are chosen in part as reward for their political involvement
and that they seek those offices because of a dissatisfaction with or a lack of
capacity for law practice. But that dissatisfaction does not mean necessarily
that they are a more reflective or a more obvious audience for these books.
If neither the lawyers, the legislators, nor the judges read these books,
then who does? Though it is impossible to know their numbers, one can
identify a series of likely readers. The first are academics with law degrees.
In the university these persons call themselves "lawyers" only to distinguish
themselves from philosophers or psychologists. They are teachers of law,
not practitioners of it. Many of them find their orientation not toward the
bar but toward the university; they surely are a natural audience for these
books. Another audience will be academics who are not lawyers but are
teachers of philosophy, political science or economics. Finally, the largest
audience for these books are the intellectuals not employed by universities.
A fair share will be lawyers, but they will be neither more nor less attracted
to the books because they are lawyers than if they were businessmen, research physicists or housewives.
If one is forced to concede that only one out of fifty thousand lawyers
and perhaps one out of one thousand law teachers might read any given
book on our list, must he not then abandon the idea that such books will
ever have an influence on anyone's acts? Must he not concede that many of
these books will sink without a trace? Those are questions which authors
rarely address, but they are important.
To put the political influence of these books in perspective, let us first
consider some of the ways in which ideas have recently been translated into
action in the law schools and in society at large. Three examples come to
mind. First is the Ford Foundation funded effort to stimulate the growth of
clinical legal education. This effort was directed by the Council on Legal
Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR), a Ford spin off.5
CLEPR conducted a series of conferences and stimulated discussion in
journals about legal education. It also funded pilot programs at various
schools. 6 The result of those efforts has been the establishment of clinical
5. See Pincus, The President'sReport, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR LAW STUDENTS 27-28

(1980). See also Counsel on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility, Inc. [CLEPR]
Newsletter (Jan. 1969), reprintedin CLEPR NEWSLETTERS 1969-1972, at 1.
6. See also Pincus, supra note 5; CLEPR, LAW SCHOOL TEACHING CLINICS (1977). See
generally CLEPR NEWSLETERS (1969-present) (descriptions and discussions of various

CLEPR programs).
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education courses at nearly every law school in the country. 7 While some

courses existed prior to the CLEPR effort, and doubtless others would have
grown without CLEPR, it is improbable that clinical education would have

enjoyed the kind of growth that it has without CLEPR's money. Moreover,
given the prospect of declining law school enrollment and the relatively

high cost of clinical education programs, any spontaneous movement of
that kind might well have been nipped in the bud if CLEPR had not been

there to bring it to full bloom prior to the shortage of money and students.
A more apt illustration is the operation of the Olin Foundation through
Henry Manne's Summer Economics Institute for Law Professors. Manne
commenced that effort at the University of Rochester in 1971.8 Since that

time the publication in legal periodicals dealing with economics has expanded exponentially. Today one rarely picks up a leading journal without
an article on antitrust law, contract damages, or tort that relies heavily on
economic theory and analysis. I would suggest that there is a connection
between the Manne-Olin effort and this flowering of economic understanding in the law school world.9 Here then are two cases where persons with
adequate resources, the Ford Foundation and the Olin Foundation, were

able to purchase a place, in one case in the curriculum and in the other case
in the literature of legal academe.
A quite different example of the translation of ideas into action can be
found in the application of "supply side" economics to the national economy. The striking thing about supply side economics is that it has no long
standing or well-recognized academic base. Its chief proponent, Professor

Laffer, does not have the highly respected academic following that a Milton
Friedman enjoys, and there is widespread skepticism about its merits. 10

Nevertheless, through the election of persons receptive to their ideas, particularly Congressman Kemp, Senator Roth, and President Reagan, and

through the appointment of persons who are also committed to the supply
7. See Pincus, supra note 5, at xi. See also Bogomolny, PrefatoryRemarks, ClinicalLegal
Education and the Legal Profession, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 345 (1980).

8. Manne now teaches at Emory University Law School, and the institutes are conducted
at the Emory University Law and Economics Center.
9. A comparison of the work of some Summer Economics Institute participants preceding
and following their attendance at the Institute reflects this transition. Compare, e.g., Brodley,
Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts - From Economic Theory to Legal
Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv. 285 (1967); Ratner, Legislative Resolution of the InterstateChild Custody Problem: 4 Reply to Professor Curieand.4 Proposed Uniform Act, 38 S. CAL. L. Rv.
183 (1965), and Sweet & Sweet,ArchitecturalCost Predictions:A Legal andlnstitutionalAnalsis, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 996 (1968), with Brodley, The PossibilitiesandLimits ofDecision Theory
in Antitrust: A Response to Professor Horowitz, 52 IND. L.J. 735 (1977); Brodley, Potential
Competition Mergers: A StructuralSynthesis, 87 YALE L.J. 1 (1977); Ratner, Choice of Law:
InterestAnalysis and Cost Contribution, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 817 (1974), and Sweet, Site Architects and Construction Workers: Brothers and Keepers or Strangers?, 28 EMORY L.J. 291

(1979).
Recognizing that it has not touched the seat of power, Manne's Law and Economics Center
at Emory University also presents similar courses for federal judges and doubtless would do
the same for lawyers if it had an adequate means to identify the lawyers who are most likely to
influence court and other decisionmakers.
10. See Blustein, Supply Side Theories Became FederalPolicy With Unusual Speed, Wall
St. J., Oct. 8, 1981, at 1, col. 6; Merry & Bacon, Supply-Side Economics andHowIt Grew From
a Theory to a PresidentialProgram, Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 1981, at 48, col. I.
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side ideology, 1' we see the translation of an idea into action in short order.
One supposes throughout history this process is the most direct and immediate method of translation of ideas into action, namely to convince the
king of the merit of a particular idea so that the king will implement it.
Returning to our books, can one trace a similar development of idea to
application? Because so few are to read these books and because an insignificant number of readers are front-line actors, does it mean that they will
have no effect? Surely that is too strong. Ideas given to law teachers are
passed on in some form to their students. These students will ultimately
become the judges, lawyers and legislators who will be the front-line actors.
Surely an occasional idea is transmitted from the book to the teacher to the
student who uses it as a judge or legislator. Conceivably some of the ideas
are transmitted through volumes like this. Most of us read more reviews
than books, and it is possible that ideas faithfully reported by the reviewer
will have an impact. 12 Of course one needs only the right reviewer to give
currency to his ideas. For example, if the review happens to take the form
of an opinion in the Supreme Court, the impact is likely to be more immediate, obvious and direct as others adopt the ideas explained in the opinion.
Thus one need not find a wide audience if he finds the right audience and if
its members can present his ideas to a larger number.
Yet when all has been said that can be said on behalf of scholarly books,
I am uneasy. I feel considerable skepticism about arguments suggesting
that they have a significant impact. It would be a fascinating empirical
exercise to trace a few of the ideas expressed in the books here reviewed
into the courts and legislatures, or through the hands of reviewers into the
hands of lawyers and then into their briefs and the opinions written by
courts. Tracing an idea in that form is probably impossible until the passage of time has allowed the dust that swirls around such transmissions to
settle. Such an idea can take many forms, be articulated in many ways and
undergo subtle changes of expression and even of content with the perspective gained from passage of time. For those reasons one is likely to be able
to trace the tracks of an idea only when it is extraordinary and overpowering. Therefore we must content ourselves with a null hypothesis: no one
can prove that the ideas expressed in these infrequently read books have no
significant impact. Yet my doubt persists. If the transmission of these ideas
is only fragmentary, is passed through a long and distorting chain going
11. Professor Laffer's ideas captured the imagination of then Wall Street Journal editorial

writer Jude Wanniski who set out to persuade Washington policymakers to incorporate Laffer's ideas in their economic planning. His articles stimulated Rep. Jack Kemp's thinking
about tax cuts, culminating in Kemp's coauthorship of the 1977 Kemp-Roth bill to cut individual income taxes over three years. During this period, Wanniski's articles also caught the
interest of Mr. Reagan and his advisers. As a result Mr. Laffer was invited to explain his
theories to Mr. Reagan who was then looking for an issue to use in his 1976 race against
President Ford. While Reagan did not formally endorse tax cuts in his 1976 campaign, he did
do so in 1980. Following his election, Reagan appointed such supply siders as David Stockman as OMB Director, Donald Regan as Secretary of the Treasury, Norman Ture as Undersecretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, and Paul Craig Roberts as Assistant Treasury
Secretary for Economic Policy. See Blustein, supra note 10.
12. Obviously one way a reviewer has an impact is on other writers who will ultimately
write things in the form of statutes or other more readily available writings.
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from reader to teacher to student to actor, it is equally plausible that the
ideas will have no ultimate impact.
Perhaps if we are honest, we must content ourselves with justifying
books on lesser grounds. A good book raises the author's status in the law
school universe. Increased status likely brings offers of employment from
other schools and thus increases one's salary. Moreover writing books is
both painful and joyful. To think carefully and intensely about a problem,
even if it is a problem of no interest to anyone else, and to write carefully
and clearly about it, is its own reward. That too should not be overlooked.
Finally, perhaps we can take refuge in the idea that books are a poor man's
way of spreading ideas. The rich, the Ford and Olin Foundations, have
more direct access to those in power. The clever, Mr. Laffer et al, get their
way through the political process. We of lesser resources must content ourselves with writing books. While the audience for such books may be small
and of limited power, authoring is not "capital intensive"; it is something
that each of us can do.
If I reveal a skepticism about the value of scholarly writing in the legal
profession it is because I intend to. I am skeptical both about the truth of
the reasons we give for writing such books and about assertions of their
ultimate impact upon society. Without being cynical one can ask that an
author view his work with appropriate skepticism. If the only consequence
of publication is the increase of the author's status in the eyes of other law
teachers, then we are not different from the members of a society for the
preservation of ancient automobiles, who periodically parade their best
specimens before each other to see whose Pierce Arrow is in the best condition, whose 1938 Mercedes is most carefully restored. On the other hand
my skepticism may merely reflect a troglodyte mentality insensitive to the
native beauty of ideas.
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